(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Despite the global fanfare surrounding the recent Israeli-American military operations codenamed “Rising Lion” and “Midnight Hammer,” the stark reality is that both campaigns have failed to achieve their most critical objective: neutralizing Iran’s stockpile of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and the underground infrastructure that supports its nuclear ambitions.
Renowned non-proliferation expert Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute and the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies offered a searing indictment of the strikes, stating: “Why am I so unimpressed by these strikes? Israel and the U.S. have failed to target significant elements of Iran’s nuclear materials and production infrastructure. Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer are tactically brilliant, but may turn out to be strategic failures.”
The gravity of this failure cannot be overstated.
At the core of the issue lies Iran’s estimated 400 kilograms of Uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235 purity—a stockpile which, if further enriched, would yield enough weapons-grade uranium to construct nine to ten nuclear warheads.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself cited this as a principal justification for the preemptive strikes, asserting: “Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs—nine.”
According to intelligence assessments, this stockpile was being stored inside fortified underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility.
Despite extensive aerial bombardment of the facility by Israeli and U.S. assets, there appears to have been no direct attempt to destroy these tunnels or the critical nuclear material within.
Worse still, the current location of the HEU stockpile remains unknown.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi has confirmed that Iran moved the uranium prior to the attacks.
Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio controversially claimed that “nothing can move” inside Iran, a statement that is now contradicted by clear visual and satellite evidence showing heavy equipment and trucks mobilizing days before the strikes.
This equipment was observed at Isfahan, likely involved in sealing tunnels or relocating sensitive nuclear components.
Similar truck activity was reported at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), where entrances were reportedly buried under dirt, suggesting a coordinated Iranian effort to obscure and protect vital assets.
The notion that Iran is somehow immobilized or technologically incapable of rapid response has been thoroughly discredited.
Washington’s fallback talking point is that the strikes succeeded in crippling Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium further or convert it into metal, a necessary step in weaponizing HEU.
However, Dr. Lewis categorically refutes this narrative, stating: “IT’S NOT FINE.”
He acknowledges that while the enrichment sites at Qom (Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant) and Natanz (Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and Fuel Enrichment Plant) may have sustained meaningful damage, the vast underground complex adjacent to Natanz—reportedly housing Iran’s centrifuge production line—remains untouched.
This subterranean facility, moved deep into the mountains in 2022, is estimated to span over 10,000 square meters.
Its reinforced depth makes it highly resistant to conventional bunker-busting munitions, and its precise capabilities remain unknown, though experts warn it may house not just centrifuge production but also clandestine enrichment operations.
Even more alarming is Iran’s recent disclosure to the IAEA regarding a new enrichment facility at an undisclosed secure location near Isfahan.
The agency was reportedly preparing to inspect the site prior to the airstrikes.
To date, there is no indication this facility was ever targeted.
This raises serious concerns that multiple layers of Iran’s nuclear program remain fully functional despite the surgical nature of the military campaign.
Iran’s ability to retain critical nuclear infrastructure not only challenges the efficacy of kinetic military operations but also underscores the resilience of its nuclear architecture, particularly when buried deep beneath hardened geological formations.
Dr. Lewis notes: “This means Iran has retained 400 kg of 60 percent HEU, the ability to manufacture centrifuges, and one, possibly two underground enrichment sites. That is also to say nothing of possible secret sites, which opponents of the JCPOA used to invoke all the freaking time.”
If Tehran were to now shift to a breakout strategy, the timeline to achieving a nuclear weapon could be dangerously short.
Based on current enrichment capabilities, Iran could install roughly 1.5 cascades of IR-6 centrifuges each week.
Within six weeks, that equates to nine cascades.
These cascades would then require approximately 60 days to enrich the entire 400 kg of 60 percent HEU into weapons-grade uranium.
In total, the estimated timeline from zero to bomb-capable uranium could be as short as five months.
Such a timeline fundamentally alters the strategic equation, especially when viewed against the backdrop of ongoing regional tensions involving Israel, the United States, and Gulf Arab states.
More troubling still is the comparison with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear deal abandoned by the Trump administration.
Dr. Lewis draws a clear contrast: “Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer have not slowed the Iranian program nearly as much as the JCPOA. We hold diplomacy to much higher standards than bombing.”
This observation highlights a growing paradox: that high-profile military action may yield less durable strategic results than painstaking diplomatic agreements, even if politically unpopular.
Those who once decried the JCPOA’s eventual “sunset clauses” now appear satisfied with having delayed Iran’s nuclear ambitions by only a few months.
The implication is clear: the true motive behind the strikes may not have been to stop the bomb but rather to accelerate regime change.
Meanwhile, Iran likely retains not only the 400 kg HEU stockpile but also multiple unbombed underground facilities—some potentially deeper than Fordow—which have evaded detection and destruction.
This presents a chilling scenario: a nuclear program that remains not only intact but perhaps more elusive and determined than ever.
The strategic community must now confront a sobering truth.
Despite billions of dollars in advanced weaponry, real-time intelligence, and global satellite coverage, the combined U.S.-Israeli military effort has failed to neutralize the most critical components of Iran’s nuclear weapons pathway.
If the goal was to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities, then the mission has, by every strategic metric, failed.
And if the goal was merely to delay Iran, then the international community must now ask—at what cost, and for how long?
— DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA