(GEO MILITARY AFFAIRS) — In a development poised to upend the global nuclear equilibrium, Pakistan is reportedly developing a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with the ability to strike the continental United States — a strategic evolution that, if confirmed, would place Islamabad alongside the world’s most formidable nuclear powers.
According to a high-impact exposé by Foreign Affairs, U.S. intelligence agencies have identified classified indicators suggesting Pakistan is quietly accelerating a long-range missile program, with clandestine assistance from China, that would enable it to field an ICBM capable of delivering a nuclear warhead over 10,000 kilometers.
The implications are seismic.
Such a capability would not only bring the U.S. mainland within Pakistani missile range for the first time in history, but it would also transform Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine from one of regional deterrence vis-à-vis India to a global force projection posture aimed at deterring American intervention in a future Indo-Pakistani conflict.
“If Pakistan acquires an ICBM, Washington will have no choice but to treat the country as a nuclear adversary. No other country with ICBMs that can target the United States is considered a friend,” U.S. officials were quoted as saying in the report.
This blunt warning underscores the gravity of the moment.
It marks a possible rupture in the already fragile U.S.-Pakistan security dynamic, with Islamabad now potentially facing the same adversarial classification currently applied to Russia, China, and North Korea — the only nations whose ICBMs can directly threaten the United States.
Historically, Pakistan has justified its nuclear weapons program as a necessity to counterbalance India’s conventional military superiority, particularly after New Delhi’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998.
To that end, Islamabad developed a robust suite of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles under programs such as Hatf, Shaheen, and Ghauri — most of which are designed to deliver tactical or strategic nuclear warheads across Indian territory.
But the leap to intercontinental strike capability represents a fundamental departure from this deterrence logic.
The move is believed to be motivated by Islamabad’s fears of a decapitation strike by the United States or Israel in the event of an escalating crisis in South Asia, particularly after India’s 2025 Operation Sindoor, which showcased New Delhi’s growing appetite for pre-emptive conventional strikes.
By possessing an ICBM that can hit the U.S. mainland, Pakistan likely aims to create a “deterrence envelope” that discourages American interference or neutralization attempts against its nuclear arsenal during a full-scale war with India.
At present, Pakistan has no known ICBM in its declared arsenal.
However, it maintains a growing inventory of nuclear-capable delivery systems that are rapidly increasing in range, sophistication, and survivability.
Among them is the Shaheen-III, a solid-fuel, surface-to-surface ballistic missile tested in 2022 with an operational range of over 2,750 km — enough to reach India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands and signal a full-spectrum deterrent.
The Shaheen series is known for its high mobility, short launch preparation time, and improved accuracy — features that enhance Pakistan’s second-strike capability in the event of a counterforce attack by India or a U.S.-led coalition.
Prior to Shaheen-III, the Ghauri series — based on North Korean Nodong technology — provided medium-range, liquid-fuel ballistic options with ranges around 1,300 km, but these have largely been eclipsed by solid-fuel alternatives due to reliability concerns and longer fueling times.
In 2017, Pakistan unveiled the Ababeel, a medium-range ballistic missile reportedly equipped with MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) technology, which allows a single missile to carry and deliver multiple warheads to different targets — a feature typically found in advanced ICBM arsenals.
The Ababeel’s range is estimated at 2,200 km, but the adoption of MIRV represents a significant doctrinal shift and technological advance that may serve as the precursor to ICBM capability.
China’s suspected involvement in this secret ICBM program further amplifies regional and global anxieties.
Beijing has historically provided critical assistance to Pakistan’s missile infrastructure, including the transfer of M-11 short-range missiles, technical guidance on solid-fuel propulsion systems, and satellite technology essential for inertial navigation and reentry vehicle targeting.
Now, with China itself facing intensifying strategic competition with the United States, its covert support for Pakistan’s ICBM ambitions may be part of a broader strategy to create new deterrent vectors against Washington — essentially opening a western flank to complement Beijing’s own missile threat in the Indo-Pacific.
From a cost standpoint, the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile system is a massive undertaking.
Estimates suggest that a full-scale ICBM program — including warhead miniaturization, guidance systems, mobile launchers, and survivability infrastructure — could cost upwards of $3 billion (RM14.2 billion) over a decade.
Each missile unit, depending on its configuration, could cost between $50 million to $70 million (RM237 million to RM332 million), excluding command-and-control and maintenance expenses.
Yet, given Pakistan’s longstanding prioritization of strategic parity with India and now, potentially, nuclear deterrence against the U.S., such a financial burden is unlikely to serve as a long-term deterrent.
U.S. defense planners are already responding with concern.
Any credible Pakistani ICBM threat would necessitate revisions to America’s National Missile Defense architecture, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, and Indian Ocean regions.
Forward-deployed assets such as Aegis-equipped warships, THAAD batteries, and space-based sensors may need to be realigned to account for a new threat axis emerging from the Pakistan-China nexus.
The development also risks igniting a dangerous arms race in South Asia.
India, which already operates the Agni-V (range 5,500–8,000 km) and is testing the Agni-VI (expected range 10,000+ km with MIRVs), may double down on its strategic forces to counter both Pakistan’s ICBM and China’s growing stockpile of DF-41-class missiles.
Such escalation would further undermine global non-proliferation regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) frameworks, neither of which bind Pakistan or China in any verifiable way.
It is also worth noting that Pakistan’s ICBM trajectory comes at a time of shifting global alliances.
As U.S.-India strategic convergence deepens — particularly under the QUAD and INDUS-X frameworks — Islamabad appears increasingly inclined to secure its deterrent not just against regional actors, but against global superpowers.
While Pakistani officials continue to reiterate that their nuclear program remains purely defensive, the pursuit of ICBM-range strike capability points to a new, more assertive phase in Islamabad’s strategic posture.
If Pakistan successfully tests an ICBM in the coming years — with range verification by international monitoring stations — the geopolitical fallout will be swift and significant.
Washington could respond with sanctions, export restrictions, and potentially diplomatic isolation under frameworks such as the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), particularly if Chinese involvement is formally established.
In the long term, the emergence of a Pakistani ICBM capability may catalyze a restructuring of global missile defense systems, recalibration of alliances, and renewed efforts by non-proliferation bodies to reign in missile technologies in the Global South.
For now, the world watches quietly — but with growing unease — as a new shadow emerges on the nuclear horizon.
And if Islamabad’s ICBM project crosses the threshold from intelligence reports to test-launch reality, the balance of deterrence, not just in South Asia but across the globe, will be irrevocably altered.
— GEO MILITARY AFFAIRS