(GEO MILITARY AFFAIRS) — The mere prospect of Iran acquiring China’s J-10C “Vigorous Dragon” has injected fresh urgency into an already volatile Middle Eastern airpower race, rattling planners from Tel Aviv to Riyadh and testing the geopolitical patience of Washington.
For decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) has struggled under a suffocating blanket of Western arms embargoes, limping along with an eclectic fleet of Cold War relics — including the venerable F-14 Tomcat, F-4 Phantom II, and F-5 Tiger II — a testament to the Shah’s pre-revolution ties with the United States.
Sanctions, attrition, and isolation have forced Iranian engineers to become masters of cannibalisation and improvisation, keeping aging fighters barely airworthy with indigenous upgrades, black-market spares, and a fair amount of reverse engineering.
But in the era of networked warfare, advanced AESA radars, and Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile duels, Tehran’s archaic air fleet is simply no match for the cutting-edge fifth-generation F-35I Adir stealth fighters flown by the Israeli Air Force or the Gulf Cooperation Council’s modern squadrons of F-15SA, Rafale, Typhoon, and F-16 Block 70 jets.
Against this backdrop, the Chengdu J-10C emerges as an alluring stopgap — a fourth-generation plus (4.5 or 4++) fighter designed to deliver high-end capabilities at a fraction of the cost and political baggage tied to Western procurement.
Sources close to the IRIAF leadership suggest that talks over the J-10C have advanced quietly under the umbrella of Iran’s 25-year strategic partnership agreement with China, inked in 2021 — a sweeping pact covering energy, infrastructure, and crucially, defence cooperation.
For Beijing, any sale of J-10Cs to Tehran would signal a bold step in defying the US-led arms embargo architecture, further cementing China’s status as a rising heavyweight arms exporter willing to challenge Western hegemony in one of the world’s most contested regions.
From a tactical perspective, the J-10C represents a significant leap for the IRIAF.
Equipped with an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, digital glass cockpit, modern datalink, and advanced electronic countermeasures, the aircraft is designed to slug it out with contemporary Western fighters in both BVR and within-visual-range (WVR) engagements.
The real sting in the tail comes from the J-10C’s ability to carry the formidable PL-15 air-to-air missile — China’s latest generation BVR weapon, widely estimated to boast a maximum range of over 200 kilometres, positioning it as a peer challenger to the American AIM-120D AMRAAM and Europe’s Meteor missile.
Analysts believe that by fielding the PL-15, Iranian pilots would gain an unprecedented reach in air combat, potentially deterring Israeli or GCC reconnaissance and strike aircraft from operating with impunity near Iranian airspace.
The timing could not be more consequential.
Open-source intelligence and Western defence assessments suggest the war in Ukraine has exacted a heavy toll on Russia’s own air fleet, with significant losses in Su-34, Su-35, and Su-25 aircraft — a dynamic that has forced Moscow to prioritise its own replenishment needs, leaving Tehran with limited alternatives for new high-end fighters.
China, meanwhile, sees an opportunity to expand its arms market footprint into a region long dominated by American, European, and Russian equipment.
Beijing’s recent sales of the JF-17 Block III to Myanmar and Pakistan, alongside the J-10C’s induction into the Pakistan Air Force, have given Chinese aviation firms both operational credibility and valuable export momentum.
The potential deal could mirror Pakistan’s procurement, where the PAF’s J-10Cs have been showcased as a credible counterbalance to India’s Rafale and Su-30MKI fleet, even conducting integrated exercises with PL-15 missiles to demonstrate BVR kill chains.
Should Iran replicate Pakistan’s operational model, the IRIAF’s ability to mount layered air defence for strategic facilities — including hardened nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and the soon-to-be-operational underground Qom complex — would be significantly strengthened.
This raises the stakes for any Israeli pre-emptive strike scenarios.
For Tel Aviv, the enduring doctrine of striking Iranian nuclear infrastructure before a perceived “point of no return” hinges on the Israeli Air Force’s unchallenged air supremacy and electronic warfare dominance.
A fully operational Iranian J-10C fleet would not neutralise the F-35I’s stealth edge, but it would complicate mission planning, extend the Iranian detection and engagement range, and force Israeli planners to account for more robust defensive counter-air.
Meanwhile, Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE would see their own procurement timelines thrown into sharper focus.
Already investing heavily in F-15SA, Typhoon, Rafale, and a possible future tranche of F-35s, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would likely push to acquire additional BVR missile stocks such as the Meteor and AIM-120D, plus advanced electronic warfare pods, to ensure that Iran’s incremental gains don’t translate into a broader strategic shift.
For the United States, this development would be further evidence of Beijing’s expanding military footprint, feeding into the intensifying Washington-Beijing rivalry that increasingly shapes defence postures from the South China Sea to the Gulf.
A squadron of J-10Cs in Iranian service might prompt renewed Congressional calls for tightening sanctions on Chinese defence firms and their subsidiaries — yet the reality is that the shifting sands of the multipolar arms market often defy straightforward containment.
On the operational side, Tehran would face formidable challenges in sustaining the J-10C.
Maintenance-intensive fly-by-wire controls, advanced avionics, and an AESA radar suite would all demand consistent spare parts and technical support, areas where Chinese contractors would become indispensable under any future sanctions.
Training pipelines would also require modernisation.
Iranian pilots, long accustomed to analog cockpits and outdated radar modes, would need extensive conversion training to exploit the J-10C’s datalink, sensor fusion, and electronic warfare capabilities to their full potential.
If Beijing chooses to deepen its training support, including pilot exchanges and instructor rotations, the partnership could evolve into a deeper operational dependency — one that might reshape Iran’s air doctrine around Chinese concepts of “informatised warfare.”
Financially, each J-10C is estimated to cost around USD 40–45 million per unit, translating to roughly RM 190–215 million each.
A modest package of 24 aircraft could push the bill above USD 1 billion (RM 4.7 billion) before factoring in weapons, training, ground support equipment, and sustainment costs.
Such an outlay, while significant for sanction-strapped Iran, would likely be absorbed through energy barter arrangements and long-term credit lines under the Iran-China strategic framework.
The potential impact extends far beyond cockpit hardware.
A more capable IRIAF would embolden Iran’s broader regional strategy, providing air cover to the IRGC and Quds Force activities across the Levant and Yemen, and complicating air interdiction missions by Israel or Saudi Arabia targeting Iranian supply chains to proxies like Hezbollah or the Houthis.
Moreover, any forward deployment of the J-10C to airbases in Syria would further test the fragile deconfliction protocols between Russian, Israeli, and Iranian forces operating in the crowded Levantine skies.
Israel, which has carried out hundreds of strikes on Iranian weapons convoys in Syria, could find itself facing a more credible Iranian air cover element, potentially elevating the risk of aerial clashes between Israeli F-35Is and Iranian J-10Cs — a scenario with profound escalatory consequences.
For Beijing, meanwhile, a successful operational debut of the J-10C under Iranian colours could solidify its reputation as a serious supplier of high-end combat aircraft outside its traditional sphere of influence, feeding into broader ambitions for the FC-31/J-35 stealth fighter and the export-variant J-20 in future decades.
In the end, the real question is not just whether Iran can afford or acquire the J-10C, but whether it can effectively integrate, maintain, and employ it in a way that meaningfully shifts the regional airpower balance.
One thing is certain: the era when Iran’s air force could be written off as a museum relic may be coming to a close — and the new generation of the “Vigorous Dragon” could be the catalyst that redraws the rules of the Middle East’s aerial chessboard.
— GEO MILITARY AFFAIRS