In a revelation that has rocked Western intelligence and reignited anxieties in Middle Eastern defence circles, Iran’s relentless 12-day missile offensive did not just hammer Israeli civilian and industrial infrastructure but also dealt direct blows to at least five strategic military facilities, including a vital intelligence collection centre, as confirmed by The Telegraph.
This dramatic insight, reconstructed through detailed radar signatures and high-resolution satellite imagery analysed by researchers at Oregon State University, underscores how far Iran’s missile force has evolved into an arsenal capable of challenging even the world’s most sophisticated multi-layered air defence systems.
At the heart of this unprecedented strike package was Iran’s growing deployment of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) — next-generation systems engineered to pierce interception nets like Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, and even the US-supplied THAAD batteries.
Among the high-value targets confirmed hit were the Camp Zipporit base near Nazareth, the fortified Camp Glilot installation, the strategically pivotal Tel Nof Airbase, a critical logistics hub sustaining frontline operations, and a sensitive SIGINT centre believed to form the backbone of Israel’s electronic intelligence gathering against adversaries like Hezbollah and Iranian proxies in Syria.
The barrage reportedly struck near the Kirya Military Headquarters — Israel’s nerve centre for national defence command and control — revealing both Tehran’s precision targeting and its willingness to risk direct confrontation with the heart of Israeli military decision-making.
Yet none of these direct hits were disclosed by the Israeli authorities during the conflict — a silence enforced under Israel’s draconian wartime censorship laws that ban the release of sensitive operational damage assessments for fear of emboldening enemies or sowing public panic.
This secrecy has once again ignited debate over the delicate balance between national security and the democratic right to an informed public, especially when the stakes include direct hits on the country’s most sensitive defence installations.
At the core of this battlefield narrative is not only the audacity of Tehran’s targeting but the sheer scale of its offensive firepower.
Across the 12-day conflict, Iran is assessed to have launched more than 500 ballistic missiles at Israeli territory — the largest such barrage in the history of modern Middle Eastern missile warfare.
Alongside these came an unprecedented swarm of around 1,100 drones, though only a single UAV successfully penetrated Israeli airspace to cause damage — a testament to the enduring strength of Iron Dome and David’s Sling against slower, low-flying threats.
But The Telegraph’s radar analysis reveals an unsettling trend: the interception success rate dropped progressively as the fighting wore on, especially in the first eight days of the war.
By day seven, an estimated 16 percent of Iranian missiles were slipping through Israel’s and America’s layered air defences — with an increasing share landing direct blows on high-value military and strategic infrastructure.
This drop-off in effectiveness triggered a wave of speculation among defence analysts.
Some experts believe the IDF deliberately rationed its interceptor stocks — a theory supported by The Wall Street Journal’s wartime report that Israel was running dangerously low on Arrow interceptor missiles, forcing commanders to choose which threats merited a costly interception.
The IDF dismissed these reports, asserting that its missile inventory had been stocked in advance to sustain a protracted engagement.
However, multiple sources confirm that the sheer scale of Iran’s mixed salvo attacks — blending fast ballistic missiles, slower drones, and manoeuvrable warheads — forced Israel and its US partners to stretch their kill chain to its limits.
Meanwhile, the Israeli daily Haaretz has reported that the US military expended 93 THAAD interceptors over an 11-day period to defend Israel, revising the estimated cost of the operation from an initial USD 800 million to approximately USD 1.2 billion (RM3.76 billion to RM5.65 billion)
Given that the annual production rate for THAAD interceptors ranges between 36 and 48 units, the US effectively depleted nearly two years’ worth of inventory during the conflict.
Adding to the challenge, Iran unveiled new warhead configurations during the barrage.
On June 19, Iranian forces deployed at least one cluster bomb warhead, scattering more than 20 submunitions across an 8-kilometre (5-mile) blast radius.
One of these munitions, with a 2.5-kilogram explosive payload, struck a residential home in the central Israeli town of Azor, inflicting damage equivalent to that of a direct hit from a battlefield rocket.
Defence analysts say this use of cluster munitions, alongside hypersonic-capable and MaRV-equipped missiles, marks a new inflection point for Israeli and American missile defence doctrines.
Hypersonic glide vehicles, travelling at speeds exceeding Mach 5 and capable of abrupt mid-flight manoeuvres, are especially challenging for legacy interception systems designed for predictable ballistic trajectories.
Many believe these Iranian advances draw on technology transfers or inspiration from Chinese DF-17 glide vehicle research and Russia’s Avangard platform, which have already reshaped global strategic missile defence equations.
While the Iron Dome remains the world’s most combat-tested short-range defence system, its inherent design limitations mean heavier, faster, and more agile threats must be countered by upper-tier systems like David’s Sling, Arrow 2/3, and the US THAAD network — a burden that dramatically escalates the cost per intercept.
In total, Iran’s missile and drone onslaught struck over 40 Israeli infrastructure sites, including power grids, industrial plants, and transportation nodes that keep the Israeli military’s frontline units supplied with fuel, ammunition, and reinforcements.
The broader psychological and geopolitical impact of these strikes reverberates far beyond the physical craters left behind.
Tehran’s ability to simultaneously challenge Israeli missile defences, exhaust US stockpiles, and sow doubt about the impenetrability of the Iron Shield sends an unmistakable signal to the Gulf Arab states, Western NATO partners, and Tehran’s rivals across the Sunni world.
Supporters of Israel’s military censorship argue that suppressing details of these direct hits prevented Iran and its proxies from capitalising on propaganda victories that could inflame regional tensions further.
But critics warn that keeping the public in the dark about vulnerabilities in billion-dollar defensive systems risks stifling urgent debate about procurement priorities and strategic recalibration — especially as the region edges closer to another potential escalation.
As the IDF and its US allies now rush to replenish depleted Arrow and THAAD stockpiles, planners are left with sobering lessons about the pace of missile technology proliferation and the rising costs of defending hardened urban and military targets.
In the next round — and there almost certainly will be one — the battlespace will be defined by faster, stealthier, and more manoeuvrable threats that test Israel’s Iron Dome, Arrow and David’s Sling beyond what they were designed for two decades ago.
For Israel’s military planners, Western backers, and Gulf partners eyeing similar systems, this 12-day conflict has laid bare a harsh reality: the future of missile warfare in the Middle East will be faster, more complex, and far more expensive than ever before.
How did Iran’s missiles breach Israel’s Iron Dome?
Radar and satellite data confirm that Iranian ballistic, manoeuvrable, and hypersonic missiles struck five Israeli military bases and an intelligence hub during the 12-day war. Over 500 missiles and 1,100 drones were launched, with a growing number bypassing Israeli and US air defences as interception rates fell.