[GEO MILITARY AFFAIRS] — In a chilling signal that Israel’s strategic posture may be expanding beyond Iran, former Israeli Deputy Defence Minister and senior Labour Party figure Meir Masri has issued an ominous threat targeting Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme.
Masri, writing in both Arabic and Urdu on his verified X (formerly Twitter) account, stated bluntly: “After Iran’s campaign, we may seek to dismantle Pakistan’s nuclear programme.”
Although no longer holding an official government position, Masri continues to wield considerable influence in Israeli political and strategic circles as a member of the Labour Party’s Central Committee.
He further warned, “Pakistan is not far from Iran. Your understanding is sufficient,” suggesting a geopolitical linkage that places Islamabad squarely in Tel Aviv’s expanding arc of threat perception.
The remarks come amid intensifying hostilities between Israel and Iran following a series of unprecedented Israeli strikes against Tehran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure, pushing the Middle East towards the brink of open interstate warfare.
Islamabad, which has long maintained ideological and diplomatic solidarity with Iran, reacted swiftly through a strong rebuke issued by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar.
“Our message is very clear for Israel: Dare not look at Pakistan,” Dar said, reaffirming Pakistan’s high-alert status and its readiness to respond with full force to any hostile move against its sovereignty or security infrastructure.
These warnings coincide with a storm of online speculation alleging that Pakistan threatened a nuclear response should Israel launch atomic weapons against Iran—rumours categorically denied by Islamabad’s civilian and military leadership.
However, Iranian state media has amplified the stakes further by broadcasting an explosive claim from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) general and senior National Security Council member Mohsen Rezaei.
“Pakistan has told us that if Israel uses nuclear missiles, we will also attack it with nuclear weapons,” Rezaei asserted during a televised national broadcast, attributing the quote to direct conversations between Tehran and Islamabad.
While the veracity of that assertion remains unconfirmed by Pakistani officials, the comment underscores the dangerous potential for nuclear escalation in a theatre already fraught with ballistic and drone exchanges.
Rezaei’s statement followed Pakistan’s formal declaration of support for Iran’s sovereignty in the wake of Israeli strikes, with Islamabad calling on Muslim-majority nations to present a unified front against Tel Aviv’s military aggressions.
Addressing Pakistan’s National Assembly on June 14, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif issued a stark warning about Israel’s widening regional offensive.
“Israel has targeted Iran, Yemen, and Palestine. If Muslim nations don’t unite now, each will face the same fate,” he said, urging states maintaining relations with Israel to sever ties and pushing for an emergency summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
Asif reinforced Pakistan’s alliance with Tehran by stating, “Pakistan has deep ties with Iran and Islamabad stands by Tehran in this difficult time… We stand behind Iran and will support them at every international forum to protect their interest.”
While rhetoric from political leaders is intensifying, the core strategic question remains whether Pakistan is prepared—or capable—of extending its nuclear deterrent beyond South Asia in defence of an ally like Iran.
According to 2025 estimates by multiple Western intelligence and proliferation-monitoring agencies, Pakistan currently possesses approximately 170 nuclear warheads, a number projected to reach 200 by year-end, with potential to rise to 250 over the next several years.
This steady growth positions Pakistan as one of the world’s fastest-advancing nuclear powers, potentially eclipsing India and approaching parity with the United Kingdom and France.
At the heart of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine lies the principle of Full-Spectrum Deterrence, a flexible strategy allowing the use of tactical, operational, and strategic nuclear weapons to counter conventional or existential threats.
Unlike India or China, Pakistan does not adhere to a “No First Use” policy, preserving ambiguity that could allow for pre-emptive or retaliatory use under evolving threat matrices.
Pakistan’s delivery capabilities continue to diversify, encompassing short-range tactical weapons such as the Nasr (Hatf-9), strategic ballistic missiles like the Shaheen-I and Shaheen-II, and modern Babur-series cruise missiles, providing land, sea, and potentially submarine-based nuclear platforms.
Of particular concern to regional analysts is the Shaheen-III, a solid-fuel, road-mobile medium-range ballistic missile with a declared range of 2,750 kilometres—placing Israel, if launched from western Pakistan, within theoretical striking distance.
Though no official Pakistani doctrine lists Israel as a target, the technical capacity for reach, combined with religious and ideological alignments, has triggered renewed strategic recalculations in Tel Aviv and Washington.
More significantly, Pakistan is developing the Ababeel MRBM, equipped with Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology—a capability that would allow a single missile to deliver several warheads at multiple targets, overwhelming even advanced defence systems such as Israel’s Arrow-3, David’s Sling, or Iron Dome.
Further strengthening its deterrent flexibility, Pakistan is enhancing the Babur-1B and Babur-3 cruise missiles, intended for precision strikes from land and sea platforms, with potential adaptation for nuclear payloads.
Although an operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) has not been confirmed, such developments are viewed as precursors to a nuclear triad, offering second-strike survivability crucial in an escalating regional conflict.
This evolving posture dramatically alters South Asia’s traditional strategic boundaries and introduces Pakistan as a potential nuclear actor in Middle Eastern calculations, particularly as ideological allegiances drive cross-regional alignments.
Defence analysts warn that if Pakistan’s strategic compass shifts westward in solidarity with Iran and the broader Islamic bloc, its nuclear umbrella could be recalibrated beyond India to include adversaries like Israel—especially under conditions of declared aggression or perceived existential threat.
While Islamabad officially maintains its India-centric deterrent framework, the broader defence community now recognises the risk of strategic spillover, with deterrence capabilities no longer confined by geography but increasingly defined by political convergence.
In the current multipolar environment, where theatres of conflict are merging and alliances are being redrawn at unprecedented speed, the notion of “regional nuclear exclusivity” is rapidly becoming obsolete.
Pakistan’s ability to target Israel is no longer theoretical—it is a tangible variable in any serious discussion of the Israel-Iran conflict escalation matrix.
As Meir Masri’s comments ripple through the region, the fundamental equation of modern deterrence—capability equals potential intent—is taking on new urgency in Middle Eastern and South Asian war-gaming circles.
With the convergence of expanding nuclear reach, ideological motivation, and sharpening regional confrontations, Pakistan’s arsenal is poised to become a central factor in two overlapping theatres of deterrence—South Asia and the Middle East.
This evolving dual-axis deterrence dynamic may not only redefine Pakistan’s strategic posture but could also herald the rise of a new nuclear triangle spanning Tel Aviv, Tehran, and Islamabad.
— GEO MILITARY AFFAIRS