In yet another demonstration of enduring Indo-Russian defence cooperation, Moscow is believed to have offered India the lease of a second nuclear-powered Akula-class attack submarine — a potential deal that, if realised, will dramatically boost India’s blue-water credibility in an era of intensifying Indo-Pacific rivalries.
The offer comes at a critical juncture as New Delhi accelerates the modernisation of its maritime forces to project power beyond its littorals, aiming to counter China’s growing undersea presence stretching from the Malacca Strait to Djibouti.
Multiple credible sources suggest that the submarine under consideration is the K-519 “Iribis”, a vessel originally laid down in the 1990s but mothballed amid post-Soviet financial turmoil — now eyed for revival as the next INS Chakra III under India’s expanding SSN lease programme.
For India, the strategic logic is clear: the presence of another nuclear attack submarine will deepen its sea denial and sea control capabilities at a time when the Chinese PLA Navy’s expanding fleet of Type 093 and Type 094 submarines are making regular forays into the Indian Ocean under Beijing’s “String of Pearls” strategy.
At present, the Indian Navy operates one Akula-class SSN on lease from Russia — a capability that remains indispensable in safeguarding critical sea lanes and deterring hostile incursions in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Back in March 2019, India inked a landmark Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) with Russia, committing approximately USD 3 billion (RM14 billion) to secure a 10-year lease for an upgraded Akula-class attack submarine, slated to enter service as INS Chakra III in the coming years.
That submarine, based on the battle-proven Project 971 Shchuka-B design (NATO: Akula), continues the legacy of the INS Chakra I (the K-43 Charlie-class SSN leased in the late 1980s) and the INS Chakra II (K-152 Nerpa), which operated under the Indian ensign from 2012 until its return in 2021.

Reports indicate the Akula hull selected for the lease is undergoing extensive modernisation in Russian shipyards, including the installation of advanced combat systems and long-range Kalibr cruise missiles capable of striking land and sea targets over 1,500 kilometres away.
Despite its importance, the refit programme has faced multiple delays, with the handover now projected for somewhere between 2025 and 2028, subject to the final phases of testing and sea trials.
If the K-519 “Iribis” lease is confirmed, it would be a calculated and timely boost for the Indian Navy’s undersea fleet, which remains numerically inferior to China’s expanding submarine arm that now exceeds 60 boats, including at least six nuclear-powered attack submarines and six nuclear ballistic missile submarines.
Defence analysts believe the Akula-class’ proven ability to operate at depths beyond 600 metres, with submerged speeds exceeding 30 knots and a formidable payload of 533 mm heavyweight torpedoes and long-range land-attack missiles, makes it a potent force multiplier for India’s “credible minimum deterrence” posture.
Equally important is the expertise India’s submariners and nuclear engineers will gain through real-world operations aboard the Akula platform, helping to bridge the gap to an eventual fully indigenous SSN programme — a capability that India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Shipbuilding Centre at Visakhapatnam are now pushing forward under the classified Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project.
While Moscow has yet to officially confirm the “Iribis” transfer, several credible leaks indicate the submarine — built at the Amur Shipyard and laid down in 1994 — remains structurally intact, with around 40% of its construction completed before budget cuts halted the programme in 1996.
With India’s investment estimated again at USD 3 billion (RM14 billion+), the deal would cover not just the completion of its construction but the integration of state-of-the-art sensors, combat management suites, sonar upgrades, and reworked nuclear propulsion systems to align with Indian Navy doctrine.
If the plan moves forward, the K-519 “Iribis” could become the first new-build Akula hull transferred for foreign lease, highlighting Russia’s willingness to sustain its lucrative submarine leasing model even as Moscow faces Western sanctions and a reorientation of its naval shipbuilding priorities.
Regional security experts point out that the Indian Ocean has seen a steady increase in Chinese submarine visits over the last decade, including dockings at Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Pakistan’s Karachi Harbour — activities that have caused alarm in New Delhi and among its Quad partners.
With these developments, the K-519 “Iribis” lease would ensure that India retains the ability to detect, shadow, and if required, neutralise hostile subsurface threats across strategic chokepoints like the Malacca Strait, the Andaman Sea, and the approaches to the Arabian Sea.
The Akula’s long endurance and high underwater speed also make it ideal for covert tracking of adversary carrier strike groups and for intelligence gathering missions across potential conflict zones stretching into the western Pacific, should India choose to deploy its SSN force further afield under its Act East maritime strategy.
China, meanwhile, has doubled down on its submarine expansion, commissioning newer Type 093B Shang-class boats with quieter propulsion, advanced towed sonar arrays, and the ability to carry the potent YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile — capabilities that pose a serious challenge to India’s conventional diesel-electric fleet.
With the region’s undersea domain increasingly crowded, India’s strategic bet on leasing a modernised Akula hull like “Iribis” reflects a sober recognition that deterrence at sea requires more than numbers — it demands stealth, endurance, and credible firepower.
The K-519 “Iribis”, at an estimated length of 110 metres, displacing over 12,000 tonnes submerged, and equipped with six 533 mm torpedo tubes, will remain one of the quietest and most lethal attack submarines in the Indian Ocean once operational — bridging a critical capability gap until India’s own SSN programme delivers its first indigenous hull in the early 2030s.
Sources close to the Ministry of Defence suggest that while final paperwork is still being negotiated, preliminary design review teams have already visited Russian yards to assess the hull’s condition and define the scope of modernisation needed to meet Indian Navy requirements for extended multi-theatre operations.
In the larger strategic chessboard, a revitalised Chakra fleet would signal to Beijing that India is ready to impose costs on any power that seeks to test its resolve in the IOR, even as New Delhi strengthens ties with the US, Japan, Australia, and France to uphold freedom of navigation in the wider Indo-Pacific.
As retired Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande, a noted Indian maritime analyst, points out: “With a second Akula-class SSN, India’s undersea domain awareness and ability to shape the battlespace will rise dramatically, especially if we integrate it effectively with our P-8I fleet and future indigenous ASW assets.”
While questions remain about funding, timelines, and the level of technology transfer, few doubt that the lease of K-519 “Iribis” — if signed off — will cement India’s place as one of the very few navies with a sustained nuclear-powered attack submarine capability, outside the circle of established P5 nations.
In an era defined by sharpened undersea rivalry and contested maritime spaces, India’s calculated push to keep its Chakra lineage alive sends an unmistakable message: the trident of Arihant-class SSBNs, a modernised Akula-class SSN, and an indigenous SSN on the horizon will together anchor a potent and resilient nuclear triad for decades to come.